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THE JENCKS ACT-AVAILABILITY OF JENCKS MATERIAL AT POST-TRIAL
HEARINGS-THIRD CIRCUIT EXTENDS JENCKS ACT
TO SENTENCING HEARINGS
United States v. Rosa (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1957, the United States Supreme Court held, inJencks v. United
States,' that criminal defendants were entitled, during their trials, to ac-
cess to the prior statements of government witnesses testifying against
them.2 That same year, in a legislative response to theJencks decision,
Congress enacted the Jencks Act. 3 The Jencks Act establishes a proce-
1. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
2. Id. at 668. InJencks, the defendant, who was president of a labor union,
was convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by swearing falsely in an affidavit
filed with the National Labor Relations Board that he was not a member of the
Communist party. Id. at 658-59. After two government witnesses admitted,
during cross-examination, that they made oral and written reports to the FBI,
the defendant requested that the reports be disclosed for inspection. Id. at 665-
66. The trial court denied this request, without stating any reasons. Id. at 665.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his
motions to require the government to produce, for his inspection and use in
cross-examination, the FBI reports made by the two government witnesses. Id.
at 659. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's denial of the defendant's motions as the defendant had not estab-
lished any inconsistency between the witnesses' testimony and their pre-trial
statements. Jencks v. United States, 226 F.2d 540, 552 (5th Cir. 1955).
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the defendant was not required
to establish such an inconsistency. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 666. The Court held that a
"sufficient foundation was established by the testimony [of the government wit-
nesses] ... that their reports [to the FBI] were of the events and activities related
in their testimony." Id. The defendant was thus entitled to inspect the reports
to decide whether to use them in his defense in order to discredit the govern-
ment witnesses, regardless of the admissibility into evidence of such material.
Id. at 668-69.
The procedures set down by the Court governing the disclosure of pre-trial
statements of government witnesses were an "attempt to foreclose the contin-
gency of perjured or erroneous testimony forming the basis for a conviction by
ensuring the opportunity for fully informed cross-examination." Foster, The
Jencks Act-Rule 26. 2-Rule 612 Interface-"Confusion Worse Confounded, " 34 OKLA.
L. REV. 679, 689 (1981).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1985). In response to theJencks decision and in view
of the conflicting interpretations of the opinion by lower federal courts, Con-
gress enacted § 3500, entitled "Demands for Production of Statements and Re-
orts of Witnesses," to clarify the effect of theJencks decision. See H.R. REP. No.
00, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957) (conflicting interpretations as to meaning of
Jencks and "the necessity for a procedure which will be uniform throughout the
Federal court system" led toJencks Act); S. REP. No. 569, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
2-3 (1957) (Jencks Act introduced because of conflicting interpretations ofJencks
decision); 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1861, 1862 (Jencks Act will
(927)
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dure which affords a defendant in a federal criminal prosecution access
to the pre-trial statements of government witnesses that relate to the
subject matter of the witnesses' trial testimony (Jencks material), but
only after the witnesses have testified on direct examination at the de-
fendant's trial.4 The result of the legislation is to "strike a balance be-
help correct "widespread misinterpretations and popular misunderstandings" of
Jencks). "[T]heJencks case is readily perceived as the culmination of a logical
progression in prior case law demarcating the bounds of the accused's right to
obtain certain information that is in the possession of the government and perti-
nent to his defense." Foster, supra note 2, at 688.
The legislative history of the Jencks Act cites to a collection of lower federal
court cases decided after theJencks case and prior to the enactment of the Jencks
Act. H.R. REP. No. 700, supra, at 9-11 (statement of Hon. Herbert Brownell,Jr.);
S. REP. No. 569, supra, at 5-8 (statement of Hon. Herbert Brownell,Jr.). One of
the problems which arose as a result of the judicial interpretations of theJencks
opinion was the insistence of some lower federal courts that defendants be al-
lowed to rove at will through entire government reports, although only a small
part of the reports related to the testimony of the government witness. See H.R.
REP. No. 700, supra, at 3; S. REP. No. 569, supra, at 3-4; 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, supra, at 1864. Thus, although accepting the basic premise of the
Jencks decision, Congress was concerned that the misapplication of that decision
threatened to expose secret government files and confidential information to
defendants, which could handicap the law enforcement arms of government
agencies and injure the reputations of innocent persons. See H.R. REP. No. 700,
supra, at 3; S. REP. No. 569, supra, at 4-6; 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS,
supra, at 1864. Accordingly, theJencks Act protects "the legitimate public inter-
est in safeguarding confidential governmental documents and at the same time it
respects the interests ofjustice by permitting defendants to receive all informa-
tion necessary to their defense." H.R. REP. No. 700, supra, at 4.
4. The Jencks Act currently provides:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no
statement or report in the possession of the United States which was
made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness
(other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery,
or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in
the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on di-
rect examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the
United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the
witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the sub-
ject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents
of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of
the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the de-
fendant for his examination and use.
(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be
produced under this section contains matter which does not relate to
the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order
the United States to deliver such statement for the inspection of the
court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall excise the portions
of such statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the testi-
mony of the witness. With such material excised, the court shall then
direct delivery of such statement to the defendant for his use. If, pursu-
ant to such procedure, any portion of such statement is withheld from
the defendant and the defendant objects to such withholding, and the
trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant, the
entire text of such statement shall be preserved by the United States
928
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tween the demands and necessities of the defendant to have at his
disposal all that he can to aid in his defense and the interests of the
government to protect the sources of its information and to retain the
private character of confidential documents."'5 Thus, the Jencks Act
functions as a discovery device to aid a defendant in impeaching govern-
ment witnesses on cross-examination and serves as the exclusive means
for production of the qualifying Jencks material. 6
and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made available to the
appellate court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the
ruling of the trial judge. Whenever any statement is delivered to a de-
fendant pursuant to this section, the court in its discretion, upon appli-
cation of said defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such
time as it may determine to be reasonably required for the examination
of such statement by said defendant and his preparation for its use in
the trial.
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the
court under subsection (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any
such statement, or such portion thereof as the'court may direct, the
court shall strike from the record the testimony of the witness, and the
trial shall proceed unless the court in its discretion shall determine that
the interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared.
(e) The term 'statement' as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of
this section in relation to any witness called by the United States,
means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or other-
wise adopted or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral
statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with
the making of such oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription
thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury.
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988).
One difference between the Supreme Court's decision in Jencks and the
Jencks Act is that theJencks Court required the impeaching Jencks material to be
provided by the government directly to a defendant. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 669.
Conversely, the Jencks Act requires a trial court to initially resolve disputes re-
garding producibility, and allows disclosure to a defendant of only those materi-
als which qualify as "statements" as defined in subsection (e), and which relate
to the subject matter of the witness' testimony on direct examination. See 18
U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1985). The Jencks Act also provides that if the government
refuses to produce Jencks material to a defendant, a witness' direct testimony
will be stricken or a mistrial directed. Id. § 3500(d). This provision serves as
another departure from theJencks decision, where the Court declared that a fail-
ure to produce a witness' statement would result in a dismissal. Jencks, 353 U.S.
at 672.
5. Recent Legislation, Legislation-Federal Criminal Procedure-Modification of
Jencks Decision, 56 MICH. L. REV. 314, 318 (1957). For a further discussion of the
legislative history of the Jencks Act, see supra note 3.
6. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 351 (1959) ("The purpose of
the Uencks] Act, its fair reading and its overwhelming legislative history compel
us to hold that statements of* a government witness made to an agent of the
Government which cannot be produced under the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3500
cannot be produced at all."); United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 129 (2d
Cir. 1974) (intent ofJencks Act is to afford defendants access to witness' state-
1991) 929
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Although the Jencks Act states that disclosure cannot be compelled
until after a witness has testified on direct examination "in the trial of
the case," 7 issues concerning the availability ofJencks material in a post-
trial hearing have increased. 8 Recently, in United States v. Rosa,9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the issue
of whether Jencks material should be made available to defendants at
post-trial sentencing hearings.' 0 The Rosa court held that criminal de-
fendants are entitled to Jencks material at sentencing hearings, because
such material would not only be valuable to their defense, but would
also ensure a more thorough and effective cross-examination of the gov-
ernment witnesses testifying against them."
ments for impeachment purposes, and not to compel disclosure ofJencks mate-
rial to defendants prior to trial).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1985). This provision has been construed to "fore-
stall not only all production of qualifying material in pretrial proceedings prior
to the 'trial of the case' but also compulsory premature disclosure of such state-
ments a day or so before trial." Foster, supra note 2, at 708 (footnote omitted).
Accordingly, many courts have consistently denied production of Jencks mate-
rial before a trial on the merits. See United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771, 774
(3d Cir.) (government not required to produce Jencks material during suppres-
sion of evidence hearing), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978); United States v. Se-
bastian, 497 F.2d 1267, 1268 (2d Cir. 1974) (suppression hearing not a trial and
pre-trial disclosure of Jencks material not allowed); United States v. Percevault,
490 F.2d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 1974) ("This unique but limited discovery device
Uencks Act] ... was not intended to be utilized in preparation for trial."); United
States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536, 544 (2d Cir.) (underJencks Act, "pre-witness
stand statements of persons testifying at suppression hearings are not compre-
hended within the statements the defense is entitled to examine at suppression
hearings"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969).
In addition, many courts have construed the term "trial," as required in the
Jencks Act, to mean a proceeding conducted for the purpose of determining
guilt or innocence. Murphy, 569 F.2d at 773 (citing United States v. Hodges, 489
F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1973)).
8. See United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1989) (whether disclo-
sure pursuant to Jencks Act may be required at sentencing hearings); United
States v. Hodges, 489 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1973) (addressing issue of whether
Jencks Act applies to revocation of probation hearing); Beavers v. United States,
351 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1965) (discussing whether disclosure pursuant toJencks
Act may be required in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding); United States v. White,
342 F.2d 379 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 871 (1965); United States v.
Kelly, 269 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1959) (same), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960);
United States v. Ameperosa, 728 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Haw. 1990) (whether disclo-
sure pursuant to Jencks Act may be required at sentencing hearings); United
States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (same), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
9. 891 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1989).
10. Id. at 1075. For a further discussion of the facts of the Rosa case, see
infra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
11. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1079. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Rosa, see infra notes 29-52 and accompanying text.
930 [Vol. 36: p. 927
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II. UNITED STATES v. ROSA
A. Facts
Ronald L. Plisco (Plisco), one of twenty-eight defendants in Rosa,
was indicted on two counts, involving Plisco's participation in drug deal-
ing.12 As a result of a plea agreement, the government dismissed one of
the charges and Plisco pled guilty to the other. 13
At the sentencing hearing on the charge to which Plisco pled guilty,
a government witness testified as to Plisco's involvement in a "life of
crime" and implicated Plisco in the drug sales at issue.1 4 The govern-
ment witness testified that: (1) he had known Plisco for many years;
(2) in 1984, he himself sold cocaine and wanted to sell more; (3) he
asked Plisco for money to finance his drug trafficking, and Plisco offered
him $80,000, knowing that it was to be used to purchase cocaine; and
(4) Plisco received some cocaine at cost. 15
Contrary to the government witness' testimony, Plisco averred that
he had been entrusted to hold $300,000 for the government witness. 16
Plisco's wife then testified that the money Plisco gave to the witness was
merely a return of the witness' money which Plisco had been holding.17
Because Plisco's testimony thus conflicted with portions of the witness'
testimony, it was expected that the defense would attempt to cast doubt
on the truthfulness of the witness' testimony.' 8 As a result, at the outset
of cross-examination of the government witness, Plisco's attorney filed a
motion for the production of Jencks material. 19 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied the mo-
tion.2 0 In doing so, the district court relied on the Third Circuit's
12. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1075. Plisco was one of 28 people indicted in a 113
count indictment charging drug, firearms and tax offenses. Id. In count one,
Plisco was charged with violating 21 U.S.C. § 846 for joining in a conspiracy to
possess cocaine with an intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine.
Id. In count eleven, Plisco was charged with violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) for
being in possession of a "multi-kilogram quantity of cocaine with intent to dis-
tribute." Id.
13. Id. The government dismissed count one and Plisco pled guilty to
count eleven. Id. Plisco later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. This
motion was denied and a sentencing hearing was held. Id.
14. Id. at 1075, 1078. The government witness, Marvin Droznek, was also
charged in the indictment and had pled guilty. Id. at 1075.
15. Id. "Plisco's testimony conflicted with Droznek's [the government wit-
ness] as to the source and ownership of the $80,000." Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1075, 1078. The Third Circuit in Rosa noted that it was to be
"expected that at allocution, Plisco would claim that Droznek [the government
witness] had not testified truthfully." Id. at 1078.
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decision in United States v. Murphy,2 1 which held that Jencks material was
to be produced only during trial. The district court, therefore, con-
cluded that a sentencing hearing did not fit the definition of a trial as
espoused in Murphy.22 Plisco was then sentenced to fifteen years impris-
onment and fined $50,000.23
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the defense argued that the district
court had erred on four grounds. 24 The Third Circuit, agreed with the
district court on three of the four grounds assigned as error and af-
firmed Plisco's conviction. 25 The fourth ground charged that the dis-
trict court erred in finding that "it was not necessary for the government
to provide Jencks Act material to Plisco pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500."26 The Third Circuit agreed with Plisco on the fourth ground
assigned as error and found it was erroneous for the district court to
deprive Plisco of Jencks material at his sentencing hearing.2 7 As a re-
sult, the Third Circuit vacated Plisco's sentence and remanded for
resentencing. 28
B. The Court's Application of Jencks
The Third Circuit, in a unanimous opinion, began its analysis by
21. 569 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978). For a further
discussion of the Murphy decision, see infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
22. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1077 (citing Murphy, 569 F.2d at 774). In Murphy, the
Third Circuit asserted that Jencks material was producible only at a trial, which
was defined as a proceeding conducted to determine guilt or innocence. Mur-
phy, 569 F.2d at 773 (citing United States v. Hodges, 489 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1973)). The district court in Rosa concluded that a sentencing hearing was not a
proceeding to determine guilt or innocence. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1076. For a fur-
ther discussion of the Murphy decision, see infra notes 55-60 and accompanying
text.
23. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1075.
24. Id. at 1076. Plisco alleged that the district court erred in holding that:
1) his plea of guilty was constitutionally valid; 2) the government had
not breached its plea agreement; 3) Plisco could not withdraw his guilty
plea, or in the alternative, enforce the plea agreement; and 4) it was not
necessary for the government to provide Jencks Act material to Plisco
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
Id. It was only the fourth ground that was substantively addressed by the Third
Circuit in Rosa, however, because the court summarily found that the district
court did not err in the other respects. Id.
25. Id. Specifically, the court found that "the district court did not err in
upholding Plisco's guilty plea; in holding that the government did not breach its
plea agreement with Plisco; and in holding that Plisco could not withdraw or
enforce his plea agreement." Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1076, 1079.
28. Id. at 1079. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's rationale for
vacating Plisco's sentence and remanding for resentencing, see infra notes 29-52
and accompanying text.
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss3/8
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
discussing Jencks v. United States,2 9 from which the Jencks Act took its
name and in which the Supreme Court provided its reasons for affording
a criminal defendant access, during trial, to the pre-trial statements of
government witnesses.30 The Third Circuit noted theJencks Court's em-
phasis on the value, for cross-examination purposes, of making govern-
ment documents available to defendants at trial, because it afforded
them a better opportunity to test the credibility of a witness' trial testi-
mony.31 The Third Circuit also focused on theJencks Court's recogni-
tion that where the government has a duty to see that justice is done, "it
is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke
its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which
might be material to his defense."13 2 The Rosa court concluded that the
rationale of Jencks and the purpose of the Jencks Act would be "dis-
served" if Plisco was deprived of material valuable to his defense and
liberty at his sentencing hearing.3 3
C. Review of the District Court's Rationale
The Third Circuit then proceeded to review the district court's ra-
tionale for denying Plisco's motion forJencks material at his sentencing
hearing.3 4 First, the Third Circuit disagreed with the district court's re-
liance on United States v. Murphy.3 5 The court indicated that the issue in
Murphy-whether the Jencks Act was applicable to a pre-trial suppression
29. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). For a further discussion of theJencks decision, see
supra note 2. For the relevant text of the Jencks Act, see supra note 4.
30. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1076-77 (citingJencks, 353 U.S. at 667).
31. Id. at 1076-77. InJencks, the Supreme Court stated:
Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer knows the value for
impeaching purposes of statements of the witness recording the events
before time dulls treacherous memory. Flat contradiction between the
witness' testimony and the version of the events given in his reports is
not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from the reports of
facts related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts,
even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-exam-
ining process of testing the credibility of a witness' trial testimony.
Jencks, 353 U.S. at 667. For a further discussion of theJencks decision, see supra
note 2.
32. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1077 (quotingJencks, 353 U.S. at 671 (quoting United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953))).
33. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1079. The court further stated that it could "perceive
no purpose in denying the defendant the ability to effectively cross-examine a
government witness where such testimony may, if accepted, add substantially to
the defendant's sentence." Id.
34. Id. at 1077.
35. Id. (citing United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 955 (1978)). The Third Circuit in Rosa found the district court's reli-
ance on Murphy understandable in light of the language of the Jencks Act and
the holding of the Third Circuit in Murphy.. Id. The Murphy court held that
Jencks material was not producible at a pre-trial suppression hearing. Murphy,
569 F.2d at 774. For a further discussion of the Murphy case, see infra notes 55-
60 and accompanying text.
1991] 933
7
Harker: The Jencks Act - Availability of Jencks Material at Post-Trial He
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
934 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36: p. 927
hearing-was inapposite to the issue presented in Rosa-whether the
Jencks Act was applicable to a post-trial sentencing hearing.36 Moreover,
the Rosa court noted that the Third Circuit in Murphy had recognized
some judicial authority for extending the Jencks Act to certain kinds of
post-trial hearings, although not specifically to post-trial sentencing
hearings.3 7
D. Supporting Precedent
In support of its decision, the Rosa court relied heavily upon the
reasoning articulated by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York in United States v. Fatico,3 8 in which the court held
that the Jencks Act was applicable to sentencing hearings when a gov-
ernment witness testifies.3 9 Similar to Plisco in Rosa, the defendant in
Fatico pled guilty and, at his sentencing hearing, sought to obtainJencks
36. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1077. The court noted that when it affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision in Murphy, it was "emphasizing that Jencks Act material
'was not available prior to trial.' " Id. (quoting Murphy, 569 F.2d at 774).
37. Id. As authority for applying the Jencks Act to post-trial hearings, the
Murphy court cited United States v. White, 342 F.2d 379 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 871 (1965) and United States v. Kelly, 269 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960), both of which concluded that the disclosure of
Jencks material would be required in a post-trial proceeding brought pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Murphy, 569 F.2d at 774 n. 11. Section 2255 allows a de-
fendant to attack a criminal judgment and sentence, but the scope of the attack is
limited to matters which may be raised by collateral attack. Kelly, 269 F.2d at
451. Because § 2255 limits a defendant to raising matters which only may be
raised collaterally, "errors in procedure on the initial trial of the case are not
open for review." Beavers v. United States, 351 F.2d 507, 509 (9th Cir. 1965).
"It is not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution but is an independ-
ent proceeding, civil in nature." Kelly, 269 F.2d at 451. While a § 2255 action is
"civil in character, the plaintiffs in them [are] defendants in the criminal prose-
cutions out of which the motions arose." Id. Thus, the Fourth and Tenth Cir-
cuits have concluded that a § 2255 proceeding was sufficiently in the nature of a
criminal proceeding to make the Jencks Act applicable. White, 342 F.2d at 382
n.4; Kelly, 269 F.2d at 451. The Rosa court noted, however, that neither the
White decision nor the Kelly decision was directly on point, as they did not in-
volve post-trial sentencing hearings. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1077. For a further discus-
sion of the White and Kelly decisions, see infra notes 77-79 and accompanying
text.
The Murphy court also cited United States v. Hodges, 489 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1973), as an example of a case where the court refused to order the production
of Jencks material in a post-trial proceeding. Murphy, 569 F.2d at 774 n.l 1. In
Hodges, the Fifth Circuit held that Jencks material was not producible at a proba-
tion revocation hearing. Hodges, 489 F.2d at 214. For a further discussion of the
Hodges decision, see infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
38. 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980). The Rosa court noted that "[siurprisingly, in
the years since United States v. Fatico, 458 F.2d 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) was decided,
no other court, and in particular, no court of appeals has had the occasion to
address this issue." Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1077 n.2.
39. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 400. For a further discussion of the Fatico deci-
sion, see infra notes 40-41 & 43 and accompanying text.
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material from the prosecution. 40 The district court, on remand, held
that Jencks material should be provided to the defendant, since the need
for disclosure of such material at a sentencing hearing is just as great as
it is at a trial.4 1 The Third Circuit in Rosa found that the facts before the
Fatico court were sufficiently analogous to the situation facing Plisco at
his sentencing hearing, 4 2 and thus relied on the portion of the Fatico
opinion which stated:
[T]he defendant's only hope was to attack the credibility of the
Government agents by attempting to impeach them with their
prior statements and reports. Without this limited weapon, the
defendant remained virtually defenseless. Nor could the de-
fendant rely on a subsequent trial to rectify any inaccurate find-
ings. Unlike a pre-trial hearing, which may be followed by a
trial at which the defendant is afforded full procedural protec-
tions, sentencing is the end of the line. The defendant has no
opportunity to relitigate factual issues resolved against him.43
The Third Circuit also recognized that in sentencing Plisco, the dis-
trict court in Rosa considered the government witness' testimony with-
out giving Plisco any opportunity to attack the witness' credibility. 4 4
40. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 399. In Fatico, the defendant was charged with
conspiracy to receive and receiving stolen goods from interstate commerce. Id.
at 391. The defendant pled guilty to the conspiracy charge and, during the sen-
tencing hearing, the district court denied the defendant's request to inspect cop-
ies of each of the witnesses' pre-trial statements after their direct testimony. Id.
at 399. On remand, however, the district court reversed its ruling. Id. at 400.
41. Id. The Fatico court stated that "the need forJencks discovery is just as
great at a sentencing hearing to determine a critical fact not established at trial
that directly affects the defendant's liberty, as it would be at trial." Id. (emphasis
added).
42. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1077 (the "reasoning with respect to the defendant in
Fatico is just as applicable to the situation which confronted Plisco at his
sentencing").
43. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1078 (quoting Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 400). In further
support of its decision, the Fatico court also quoted the dissenting Justices in
Palermo v. United States: "[N]othing in the Uencks] statute or its legislative
history justifies our stripping the trial judge of all discretion to make nonqualify-
ing reports available in proper cases." Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 400 (quoting Pa-
lermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 361 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
44. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1078. The Third Circuit in Rosa asserted that the
government witness' "testimony, without an attack on its credibility if such was
available, not only substantiated the government's claims of Plisco's involvement
in drug-dealing, but it also attributed a substantial criminal history to Plisco."
Id. at 1078-79. Plisco claimed, however, that the government witness partially
lied while testifying against him, as evidenced by the sentencing hearing
transcript:
THE WITNESS [Plisco]: Yes, Your Honor. I'm sorry for every-
thing that I've done and that I'm guilty of; that all the things you've
heard today from Mr. Droznek [government witness] on the witness
stand are not true. It is true that since I've been arrested in New Castle,
Armstrong County, I believe, I've gotten out of the numbers business
1991] 935
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The Third Circuit opined that sentencing is the most critical stage of a
criminal proceeding, and concluded that there was no purpose in deny-
ing Plisco material which would ensure a more effective cross-examina-
tion of the government witness, especially where such material would be
valuable to Plisco's "very liberty."'4 5
Although the sentencing of Plisco in Rosa was not governed by the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 46 the Third Circuit cautioned in a foot-
and the sports business, and I was just going along making an honest
living and turned my back on things; and I don't want any involvement
with anything or any people or any-anybody.
And, Your Honor, I beg you for leniency in the case,
understanding.
MR. HIRSCHHORN: Just let me, Your Honor-I need to ask Mr.
Plisco a question.
(Off the record discussion.)
THE WITNESS: Not all the things that Droznek said, Your
Honor, today on the witness stand in front of you are true. Not all of
them are true.
THE COURT: I understand you to say that, they were not true.
MR. HIRSCHHORN: I understand him to say all of them were not
true, but that's not exactly what he meant. What he meant is not all of
them.
THE WITNESS: Not all of them are true, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I understand your position.
Id. at 1078.
The district court sentenced Plisco to 15 years of imprisonment and fined
him $50,000. Id. at 1075, 1079. Upon imposing Plisco's sentence, the district
court said, "Mr. Plisco, not only were you involved in drug trafficking, but you
were also involved in financing other drug traffickers. The severity of your crime
must be impressed upon you." Id. at 1078. From this statement, the Third Cir-
cuit noted that the district court was "evidently ... impressed with or at least
had taken into consideration, the testimony given by Droznek [the government
witness]." Id.
45. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1079. The Third Circuit reasoned that the "rationale
ofJencks v. United States... and the purpose of theJencks Act would be disserved
if the government at such a grave stage of a criminal proceeding could deprive
the accused of material valuable not only to his defense, but to his very liberty."
Id. (footnote omitted).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1985 & Supp. 1990). In 1984, Congress enacted
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which contained, among its many fed-
eral criminal law reforms, the Sentencing Reform Act. Ogletree, The Death of
Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938,
1945 (1988). The Sentencing Reform Act established the United States Sen-
tencing Commission to draft Sentencing Guidelines which would "narrow the
disparity in sentences imposed by federal courts upon similarly situated offend-
ers for comparable criminal conduct." Id. at 1945-46. "The Act requires courts
to impose sentences 'which reflect the seriousness of the offense'; 'promote re-
spect for the law'; 'provide just punishment for the offense'; 'afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct'; 'protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant'; and 'provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective man-
ner.'" Ogletree, supra, at 1946 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)). To advance
the goals of the Act, the Commission is responsible for determining under what
circumstances a defendant would be subject to a particular sanction. Ogletree,
supra, at 1946. In addition, the Commission is required to rank each offense
10
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note that, in the future, when a sentence is mandated by the Guidelines,
a defendant's need for Jencks material may be even more compelling.4 7
In cases where the Guidelines are applied, the judge will be required to
sentence within a Guideline range based upon specific factual find-
ings.4 8 Thus, when a defendant pleads guilty, like Plisco in Rosa, the
severity of the sentence depends entirely on what facts are shown at the
sentencing hearing, and the "need by a defendant for prior statements
made by government witnesses called to testify against him, may be even
more imperative .... ,,49
Relying on all of these factors, the Rosa court decided that Plisco
was entitled to Jencks material at the sentencing hearing. 50 To hold
otherwise would deprive Plisco of material valuable not only to his de-
fense, but to his liberty, and would be contrary to the rationale of the
Jencks Court and the purpose of theJencks Act. 5 1 Plisco's sentence was
then vacated, and the case was remanded to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with the Third Circuit's opinion.52
III. ANALYSIS
The issue of whether to extend the Jencks Act to a sentencing hear-
ing was one of first impression before the Third Circuit and, aside from
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York's
decision in Fatico, it had not been addressed by another court. 53 In ana-
according to its seriousness by employing a grading scheme created by Con-
gress. Id. "To implement the grading scheme, the Commission developed
guidelines that take into consideration a multitude of factors concerning the of-
fense, including the defendant's role in the offense, whether a weapon was used,
the amount of monetary loss, and the injury to victims." Ogletree, supra, at 1946
n.48. The Act allowed a court flexibility to depart from a specified sentence
when it finds that "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance" exists that was
not adequately taken into account in the general Sentencing Guidelines. Ogle-
tree, supra, at 1946 n.49.
Plisco's sentence was not governed by the Sentencing Guidelines because
his offense occurred before they became applicable. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1079.
47. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1079 n.3.
48. Id. The Rosa court stated that in Guidelines cases, "the judge has much
less leeway to moderate a sentence based upon perceived weaknesses in the gov-
ernment's case ...." Id.
49. Id. The Third Circuit in Rosa noted:
Thus, for example, a violation of 21 USC § 841(a)(1), the crime to
which Plisco pled guilty, has a base offense range which varies from a
base level 6, which can lead to no prison sentence, to a base level 42,
which can lead to life imprisonment for even a first-time offender. ...
The severity of the sentence will depend solely on what is demon-
strated at the trial, or in the case of a guilty plea such as Plisco's, at the
sentencing hearing.
Id.
50. Id. at 1079.
51. Id.
52. Id. The Rosa court did, however, affirm Plisco's conviction. Id.
53. Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1077 n.2.
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lyzing this question, it is submitted that the Third Circuit's resolution of
this issue in Rosa represents a correct analysis of precedent and a just
result. As a consequence of the Third Circuit's decision, a criminal de-
fendant will not be deprived of material over which the government has
control and possession where it is valuable to his defense during a sen-
tencing hearing, and the government will fulfill its duty of ensuring that
justice is done.
A. Narrow Construction of the Jencks Act
Prior to Rosa, there were many courts which narrowly construed the
Jencks Act and refused to permit disclosure of Jencks material at crimi-
nal proceedings other than at a trial to determine guilt or innocence. 54
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
United States v. Murphy 55 addressed the issue of whether the Jencks Act
was applicable to a pre-trial evidentiary hearing resulting from a motion
to suppress.5 6 Although it conceded that the issue was probably not
considered by Congress, 57 the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of the defendant's motions to direct the government to produce
54. See United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771, 774 (3d Cir.) (Jencks Act not
applicable to pre-trial motion to suppress), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978);
United States v. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267, 1270 (2d Cir. 1974) (same); United
States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 1974) Jencks Act not applicable
in context of pre-trial discovery); United States v. Hodges, 489 F.2d 212, 214
(5th Cir. 1973) (Jencks Act not applicable in probation revocation hearing);
United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir.) (Jencks Act discovery not
available in pre-trial suppression hearing), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1970);
United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536, 544 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
879 (1969); Beavers v. United States, 351 F.2d 507, 509 (9th Cir. 1965) (Jencks
Act not applicable in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding).
Most of the decisions which refused to extend theJencks Act to critical crim-
inal proceedings aside from a trial dealt with requests for production of material
in the context of discovery motions or preliminary hearings. Sebastian, 497 F.2d
at 1270. In justifying its reluctance to broaden the scope of the Jencks Act dis-
closure, the Second Circuit in Sebastian asserted:
But although we might well-as a matter of policy-favor broadening
theJencks Act or generally liberalizing federal discovery, we do not feel
that we can ignore the weight of authority ... or the language of the
Act in the absence of contrary legislative history or specific direction
from Congress.
Id.
55. 569 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978).
56. Id. at 772.
57. Id. at 773. The Murphy court cited the Second Circuit in United States
v. Covello, which opined:
In all probability Congress did not consider the question whether a
suppression hearing is itself a "trial" or whether such a hearing is so
much an integral part of the criminal trial that determines a defendant's
innocence or guilt so as to intend either that the Act apply to such a
hearing or that it not do so. In any event, the courts have consistently
construed the statute literally, reading "trial" to mean "trial," and have
held that under 18 U.S.C. § 3500 the pre-witnessstand statements of
persons testifying at suppression hearings are not comprehended
12
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Jencks material during the suppression hearing.5 8 The Murphy court
opined that the language of the Jencks Act and its legislative history re-
veal that pre-trial statements of a government witness must not be pro-
duced until the conclusion of direct examination of the government
witness at trial.5 9 The Third Circuit in Murphy defined a trial as a pro-
ceeding used to determine guilt or innocence, and thus concluded that a
pre-trial evidentiary hearing resulting from a motion to suppress was
not a trial within this definition.6 °
Another case supporting the proposition that Jencks material is to
be produced only at trial is United States v. Hodges.6 1 In Hodges, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the gov-
ernment was not required to produce the prior statements of a govern-
ment witness who testified against the defendant at a probation
revocation hearing. 6 2 The Hodges court averred that the Jencks Act re-
fers only to trials, not hearings, and it was intended to apply only to
those proceedings conducted to determine guilt or innocence. 63
within the statements the defense is entitled to examine at suppression
hearings.
Covello, 410 F.2d 536, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969).
58. Murphy, 569 F.2d at 774.
59. Id. at 773-74. Although the legislative history of the Jencks Act pro-
vides little guidance about the extent of the Act's application beyond the trial
stage, the Murphy court found Congress to have been "greatly" concerned with
the timing of disclosure of pre-trial witness statements to defendants. Id. at 773.
The specific language of theJencks Act, which states that the disclosure of prior
statements by a government witness may not be compelled "until said witness
has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case," supported their finding.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
It has been argued, however, that "[l]iteral conformance with the terms of
this provision engenders delay and inconvenience . . . and may denigrate the
ability of counsel to utilize documents produced effectively during cross-exami-
nation." Foster, supra note 2, at 708-09 (footnote omitted). For the relevant
text of the Jencks Act, see supra note 4.
60. Murphy, 569 F.2d at 773 (citing United States v. Hodges, 489 F.2d 212
(5th Cir. 1973)).
61. 489 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1973). In Hodges, the defendant pled guilty to
possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. Id. at 213. The defendant was
placed under supervised probation for five years. Id. Thereafter, the govern-
ment filed a motion to revoke probation claiming that the defendant had con-
spired to import marijuana into the United States and to distribute the drug
while he was on probation. Id. During the revocation hearing, the defendant
discovered that a government witness had given a statement to the prosecution
which implicated the defendant in unlawful marijuana activities. Id. When this
government witness testified against the defendant, the defense counsel filed a
motion for the production of the statement under theJencks Act. Id. The court
sustained the government's objection that the "statement involved other indi-
viduals not yet indicted or tried" and that the "Jencks Act refers only to 'trials'
and not 'hearings' " and thus denied the defendant's motion. Id. at 213-14.
62. Id. at 214. The Fifth Circuit in Hodges stated that "theJencks Act had no
application to the revocation hearing here in issue." Id.
63. Id. The Fifth Circuit in Hodges concluded that a revocation hearing in-
volved no question of guilt or innocence, but merely determined whether a de-
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Significantly, however, Murphy and Hodges did not involve contested
sentencing hearings where the testimony of a government witness is rel-
evant to the validity and severity of a defendant's sentence, and thus
different considerations were involved.64 A pre-trial hearing, for exam-
ple, is followed by a trial in which a defendant will be afforded an oppor-
tunity to try to impeach government witnesses with their prior
statements in order to clarify any inaccurate findings.6 5 A sentencing
hearing, on the other hand, limits a defendant who has pled guilty to
only one opportunity to impeach government witnesses with their prior
statements and to persuade the judge as to certain factual allegations in
order to lessen the sentence. 66 Moreover, even if a defendant did not
plead guilty, the witnesses called at a sentencing hearing may be entirely
fendant should be required to serve a sentence for not complying with the terms
of probation. Id. The Hodges court emphasized that the defendant "had pleaded
guilty to the offense, he had been sentenced, and there was no attack on the
validity of that sentence." Id. Moreover, the Hodges court noted that, because
the trial court may declare a mistrial if the government does not comply with a
Jencks order, "the [Jencks] Act was intended to apply only to those proceedings
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the guilt or innocence of a defendant
when put to trial .... " Id.
64. See Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1077 ("Murphy involved a request thatJencks Act
material be produced at a pretrial suppression hearing, not at a post-trial sentencing
hearing." (emphasis supplied)).
65. See Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 400. The Fatico court asserted that, with a
pre-trial hearing, a defendant could "rely on a subsequent trial to rectify any
inaccurate findings" and would be "afforded full procedural protections." Id.
66. Id. The Fatico court stated that "[in the vast majority of cases which
result in a plea of guilt, [sentencing] is, for the defendant, the only critical stage."
Id. at 396 (emphasis added). The Fatico court also recognized that, at a sentenc-
ing hearing, a "defendant has no opportunity to relitigate factual issues resolved
against him" and "where, after a guilty plea, the critical fact was litigated for the
first time at the sentencing hearing, the defendant is irreparably disadvantaged."
Id. at 400.
However, like sentencing hearings, there are strong policy arguments for
requiring pre-trial disclosure at a suppression hearing. See United States v. Se-
bastian, 497 F.2d 1267, 1270 (2d Cir. 1974); Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 399. For
example, the Second Circuit stated:
Since findings at such a hearing as to the admissibility of challenged
evidence will often determine the result at trial and, at least in the case
of fourth amendment suppression motions, cannot be relitigated later
before the trier of fact, pre-trial production of the statements of wit-
nesses would aid defense counsel's impeachment efforts at perhaps the
most crucial point in the case .... [A] government witness at the sup-
pression hearing may not appear at trial so that defendants could never
test his credibility with the benefit of Jencks Act material.
Sebastian, 497 F.2d at 1270.
On the other hand, the Third Circuit in Murphy focused on the policy argu-
ments against producingJencks material at pre-trial suppression hearings. Mur-
phy, 569 F.2d at 774. If Jencks material was required to be disclosed to
defendants at pre-trial suppression hearings, "there would be significant danger
that suppression motions would be noticed, not for their stated purpose, but as
a discovery device, unavailable to those not able to trigger such a hearing in the
context of their cases." Id.
940 [Vol. 36: p. 927
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different from those who testified at the defendant's trial, and thus a
sentencing hearing will still serve as a defendant's only chance to test
the credibility of those witnesses.
B. Policy Reasons for Extending the Jencks Act to Sentencing Hearings
The legislative history of the Jencks Act provides little guidance
concerning the extent of the Act's application beyond the trial stage.6 7
Yet, the Supreme Court's decision inJencks "suggests that the need for
Jencks discovery is just as great at a sentencing hearing to determine a
critical fact not established at trial that directly affects the defendant's
liberty, as it would be at trial."16 8 Generally, the use of pre-trial state-
ments of government witnesses ensures a more thorough and effective
cross-examination of those witnesses. 69 Whether a defendant is at a
trial or at a sentencing hearing, the importance of being able to effec-
tively cross-examine government witnesses remains the same.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the Jencks Act was
"designed to further the fair and just administration of criminal jus-
tice' 70 and, thus, was intended to advance the interest that the United
States has in seeing that justice be carried out in a criminal prosecu-
tion. 71 Implicit within this interest of the United States is an assurance
that defendants will be sentenced fairly. In order for the Jencks Act to
advance this interest, and thus guarantee a fair sentence, a defendant at
a sentencing hearing must have access to Jencks material in order to
prevent the possibility of erroneous or perjured testimony from im-
pacting upon the judge's sentencing decision. Moreover, since the ad-
vent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it is important that a
defendant have an opportunity to cross-examine a government witness
thoroughly and effectively in order to establish the relevant facts which
will be considered by the sentencing judge. 72
It should be noted, however, that during a sentencing hearing, the
government's confidentiality concerns regarding disclosure of private
67. See United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536, 544 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969). The court in Covello opined that Congress probably
did not consider whether the Jencks Act should be applicable to pre-trial sup-
pression hearings. Id. For a further discussion of the congressional oversight
perceived by the Covello court, see supra note 57.
68. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 400.
69. SeeJencks, 353 U.S. at 667 (recognizing the value of pre-trial statements
for impeachment purposes); Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 399 (pre-trial statements are
critical tool for effective cross-examination).
70. Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 495 (1963) (quoting Campbell
v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 92 (1961)) (addressing whether interview report
incorporating pre-trial statements of government witness was required to be
produced to defendant under Jencks Act in bank robbery trial).
71. SeeJencks, 353 U.S. at 668 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935)) (interest of United States in criminal prosecution "is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done").
72. See Rosa, 891 F.2d at 1079 n.3.
1991]
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documents to a defendant 73 weigh more heavily than they would during
trial. At trial, a defendant's guilt or innocence will be determined. Dis-
closure ofJencks material is therefore necessary to give a defendant the
opportunity to effectively cross-examine the government witnesses and
to prove his innocence by using information which might be material to
his defense. If a defendant is found guilty, his liberty will be restricted.
The sentencing hearing is utilized to aid the judge in determining the
extent of the restriction to be imposed upon a defendant's liberty.
Thus, it is arguable that the interest of the government in preserving the
confidential nature of its files takes on a more compelling stance once a
defendant's guilt has been decided, because the crucial question is
merely how much of a defendant's freedom will be restricted, and not
whether it will be restricted.
This argument loses some of its validity, however, in light of the
recognition by some courts that sentencing "is a critical, often the most
critical, stage of criminal proceedings." 74 Therefore, it could just as
well be argued that there is no good reason why Jencks aid to defend-
ants should assume a less important stance in the process for determin-
ing how long their liberty will be restricted than it would in the elaborate
process already created to aid in their defense during trial. Cross-exam-
ination, whether it is performed at a trial or at a sentencing hearing, is
the principle means by which the truth of a witness' testimony will be
tested. It is necessary at a sentencing hearing, therefore, to afford a de-
fendant the means by which to impeach the government witnesses testi-
fying against him, since his very liberty depends on the success of his
defense.
C. Expanding the Jencks Act to Proceedings Other than Trial
Despite the narrow construction of the Jencks Act given by many
courts, "[m]odifications of the express language of the Jencks Act's limi-
tation on compelling production of Government reports to the trial set-
ting are being recognized and adopted."'7 5 For instance, United States v.
73. The legislative history of theJencks Act reveals that Congress found it
"essential to preserve the confidential nature of Government files lest innocent
persons whose names may be mentioned in the investigation of criminal cases
should be, without reason, exposed to public oblique." 1957 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1861, 1864. Congress also considered the "protection of law-
enforcement techniques, sources of intelligence, and protection of confidential
informants" as important. H.R. REP. No. 700, supra note 3, at 9; S. REP. No.
569, supra note 3, at 5.
According to the Jencks Act, defendants are only entitled to government
documents which relate to the witness' direct testimony, and will not be allowed
to rove at will through entire investigative files and government materials. 1957
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra, at 1862. Thus, the Jencks Act "will
serve both to protect individual rights during criminal prosecutions and to pro-
tect confidential information in the possession of the government." Id.
74. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 396.
75. United States v. Ameperosa, 728 F. Supp. 1479, 1482 (D. Haw. 1990).
16
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Murphy was superceded when Rule 12(i) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure was amended to require that Jencks material be provided
to criminal defendants at pre-trial hearings on motions to suppress
evidence. 76
Furthermore, many courts have applied the Jencks Act to post-trial
proceedings held pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 which entail independ-
ent and collateral inquiries into the validity of a conviction. 77 Section
2255 allows a defendant to attack a criminal judgment and sentence, but
the scope of the attack is limited to matters which may be raised only
collaterally. 78 Although a Section 2255 proceeding is an independent
civil action, and although the Jencks Act applies only to criminal prose-
cutions, the Fourth Circuit has concluded that a Section 2255 proceed-
ing was "sufficiently in the nature of a criminal proceeding" to hold the
Jencks Act applicable. 79
Thus, due to the climate of expansion regarding the disclosure of
Jencks material to defendants, it is not surprising that the Third Circuit
continued that expansion in Rosa. Moreover, it is likely that, in the fu-
ture, other courts will endorse the Third Circuit's decision in Rosa. In-
deed, one such example is United States v. Ameperosa,8 0 decided one year
after Rosa, in which the United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii adopted the decision and rationale of the Third Circuit in Rosa.8 '
The Ameperosa case is factually similar to Rosa, and like the Third Circuit
in Rosa, the Ameperosa court concluded that the government could be
compelled to provide Jencks material at a sentencing hearing. 82 The
Ameperosa court opined that the court's and society's interest in sentenc-
For a further discussion of these "modifications," see infra notes 76-79 and ac-
companying text.
76. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(i) (1983). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(i)
now provides: "(i) Production of Statements at Suppression Hearing. Except as
herein provided, Rule 26.2 Uencks Act] shall apply at a hearing on a motion to
suppress evidence under subdivision (b)(3) of this rule." Id. For a discussion of
United States v. Murphy, see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
77. United States v. White, 342 F.2d 379, 382 n.4 (4th Cir.) (Jencks material
must be produced in § 2255 proceeding), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 871 (1965);
United States v. Kelly, 269 F.2d 448,451 (10th Cir. 1959) (same), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 904 (1960). Contra Beavers v. United States, 351 F.2d 507, 509 (9th Cir.
1965) (Jencks Act inapplicable to § 2255 proceeding).
78. Kelly, 269 F.2d at 451. The legislative purpose in enacting § 2255 "was
to provide that an attack upon a judgment and sentence in a criminal case which
previously might have been made in a proceeding in habeas corpus should be
made by motion filed in the court in which the sentence was imposed .... " Id.
79. White, 342 F.2d at 382 n.4. See also Kelly, 269 F.2d at 451.
80. 728 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Haw. 1990).
81. Id. at 1483.
82. Id. at 1479. The defendant in Ameperosa pled guilty to theft and, during
the sentencing hearing, requested the court to direct the government to produce
FBI reports for the defendant's inspection and use. Id. at 1479-80. For a discus-
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ing a defendant fairly and "to only such periods of incarceration as the
facts of the crime warrant under the Sentencing Guidelines" outweighs
any government concern of being burdened or of having lengthy and
complex proceedings. 83
IV. CONCLUSION
The Rosa opinion is the first circuit court decision to require the
production of Jencks material to defendants at sentencing hearings and
represents a huge step toward assuring defendants a fair sentence. The
Third Circuit's decision in Rosa provides defendants with a critical tool
for effectively cross-examining government witnesses and, thus, in-
creases a court's ability to assess the credibility of these witnesses. Be-
cause a sentencing hearing will sometimes only afford defendants one
opportunity to attack the credibility of the government witnesses testify-
ing against them, it is essential that defendants be given any material
which may be valuable to their defense.
Furthermore, extending the Jencks Act to sentencing hearings is
supported by its stated purpose, the rationale of theJencks Court, and
the government's interest in ensuring that justice is reached. Although
the government has a more compelling confidentiality concern during a
sentencing hearing, this interest is outweighed by a defendant's interest
in establishing the relevant facts to be considered by the sentencing
judge and in being accorded a fair sentence. Moreover, the Rosa court,
by extending the Jencks Act to sentencing hearings, was merely follow-
ing the lead of other administrative and judicial decisions which have
modified the language of the Jencks Act to allow production of pre-trial
government documents at proceedings other than a trial.
Undoubtedly, the Third Circuit in Rosa recognized "[tihe value of a
witness' own prior statement in probing the validity of the witness'
memory, exposing inaccuracies in the testimony, and compelling the
qualification of unqualified assertions .... "s4 The impact of the Third
Circuit's rationale in Rosa is clearly evident from the Ameperosa opinion.
Like the Ameperosa court, other courts will recognize that the Third Cir-
cuit's decision in Rosa serves the interests of justice by affording those
83. Ameperosa, 728 F. Supp. at 1482. The Ameperosa court, like the Rosa
court, stated that the "rationale ofJencks v. United States and the purpose of the
Jencks Act itself would be disserved if the government, at such a grave stage of a
criminal proceeding, could deprive the defendant of material valuable to his
very liberty." Id.
84. Foster, supra note 2, at 689. "The procedures for disclosing pretrial
statements of government witnesses ... are an attempt to foreclose the contin-
gency of perjured or erroneous testimony forming the basis for a conviction by
ensuring the opportunity for fully informed cross-examination." Id. at 688-89.
[Vol. 36: p. 927944
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